Implications and Ramifications of a Sample-Size Approach to Intuition

[...from the chapter] In the present article, we delineate a different approach, which is by no means inconsistent, but largely overlaps with the aforementioned definitions. However, our approach is simpler and refrains from a number of rather strong assumptions to which other conceptions subscribe. Using a simple and straightforward criterion, we define intuition in terms of the size of the sample used in reaching a decision: Judgments and decisions are intuitive to the extent that they rest on small samples.

Pseudocontingencies - a key paradigm for understanding adaptive cognition

[...from the chapter] The probabilistic mind has to mirror the structure of the probabilistic world. Because the mind reflects the environment, the topic of the present volume should not be misunderstood as referring only to intrapsychic processes within individual organisms' brains or minds. Rather, the 'probabilistic mind' refers to the adaptive match between cognitive functions and environmental tasks and affordances. Studying the probabilistic mind calls for a cognitive-ecological approach that relates mental functions to environmental structures, rather than a purely cognitive approach that relates individual mental functions to micro-level intrapsychic processes, such as neuronal processes. In this respect, the cognitive-ecological perspective that guides the present article, and most other articles in the present book, may be conceived as complementary to a neuro-scientific approach to the human mind. The cognitive illusion that is in the focus of the present chapter – called pseudocontingencies – highlights the need to study the top-down constraints imposed by the environment on cognitive behavior, which are quite distinct from the bottom-up constraints of internal neuronal processes

"We are all infected or affected": The moralities of antiretroviral treatment

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Pseudocontingencies - A key paradigm for understanding adaptive cognition

[...from the chapter] The probabilistic mind has to mirror the structure of the probabilistic world. Because the mind reflects the environment, the topic of the present volume should not be misunderstood as referring only to intrapsychic processes within individual organisms' brains or minds. Rather, the 'probabilistic mind' refers to the adaptive match between cognitive functions and environmental tasks and affordances. Studying the probabilistic mind calls for a cognitive-ecological approach that relates mental functions to environmental structures, rather than a purely cognitive approach that relates individual mental functions to micro-level intrapsychic processes, such as neuronal processes. In this respect, the cognitive-ecological perspective that guides the present article, and most other articles in the present book, may be conceived as complementary to a neuro-scientific approach to the human mind. The cognitive illusion that is in the focus of the present chapter – called pseudocontingencies – highlights the need to study the top-down constraints imposed by the environment on cognitive behavior, which are quite distinct from the bottom-up constraints of internal neuronal processes.

Base-rate neglect based on base-rates in experience-based contingency learning

Predicting criterion events based on probabilistic predictor events, humans often lend excessive weight to predictor event information and insufficient weight to criterion event base-rates. Using the matching-to-sample paradigm established in studies on experience-based contingency learning in animals, Goodie and Fantino (1996) showed that human judges exhibit base-rate neglect when sample cues are associated with response options through similarity relations. In conceptual replications of these studies, we demonstrated similar effects when sample cues resemble the response options in terms of base-rates skewed in the same direction rather than physical similarity. In line with the pseudocontingency illusion (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004), predictions were biased toward the more (less) frequently rewarded response option following the more (less) frequently presented sample cue. Thus, what is a demonstration of base-rate neglect from one perspective turns out to reflect the judges' sensitivity to the alignment of skewed base-rate distributions.

Implications and ramifications of a sample-size approach to intuition

[...from the chapter] In the present article, we delineate a different approach, which is by no means inconsistent, but largely overlaps with the aforementioned definitions. However, our approach is simpler and refrains from a number of rather strong assumptions to which other conceptions subscribe. Using a simple and straightforward criterion, we define intuition in terms of the size of the sample used in reaching a decision: Judgments and decisions are intuitive to the extent that they rest on small samples

The ultimate sampling dilemma in experience-based decision making

Computer simulations and two experiments are reported to delineate the ultimate sampling dilemma, which constitutes a serious obstacle to inductive inferences in a probabilistic world. Participants were asked to take the role of a manager who is to make purchasing decisions based on positive versus negative feedback about three providers in two different product domains. When information sampling (from a computerized data base) was over, they had to make inferences about actual differences in the data base from which the sample was drawn (e.g., about the actual superiority of different providers, or about the most likely origins of negatively valenced products). The ultimate sampling dilemma consists in a forced choice between two search strategies that both have their advantages and their drawbacks: natural sampling and deliberate sampling of information relevant to the inference task. Both strategies leave the sample unbiased for specific inferences but create errors or biases for other inferences

Edinburgh 1910, Africa 2010 and the evangelicals

Peer reviewedThe most famous (and most interpreted) world mission conference was Edinburgh 1910, at which almost all Protestant missions participated. While some see Edinburgh 1910 as the height of achievement, others see it as the beginning of the decline. For the Evangelicals the issue of contention was the ecclesiology, which identified the church as all who are baptised, whereas the Evangelicals defined the church as those who have a personal “living” faith. Though the Evangelicals participated without making any fuss, it was not their conference. While Edinburgh 1910 had its roots in the Great Awakening of 1734, the Evangelicals had their roots in the Holiness Revival (1859) and in the Restorationist Revival (1828). At Edinburgh their paths met somehow, with the (then) mainstream of the missionary movement not recognising the Evangelical identity. A hundred years later Evangelicals make up the majority of the missionary movement, and those great developments fulfilling the Edinburgh vision frequently have an Evangelical tendency and challenge the Edinburgh 1910 concept of Christian unity.Research Institute for Theology and Religio